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The imposition

DEATH MATTERS
a reply to Latzer and Cauthen
by James S. Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Valerie West

of its citizens ... differs dramatically
from any other legitimate state action, it is'-as the Supreme Court
repeatedly has said--'of vital importance to the defendant and to the
community that any decision to impose the death sentence be, and appear to be, based on reason rather
than caprice or emotion." " The importance of assuring accuracy and
avoiding mistakes thus extends to all
facets of the decision to impose
death, from the conviction of murder, to the determination that the offense is of the first degree and capitally aggravated, to the conclusion
JAMES S. LIEBMAN is a professor
that no extenuating factors require a
at Columbia University School of Law.
sentence less than death.
Additional points of view reveal the
JEFFREY FAGAN is a professor at
breadth of the consensus that the deColumbia University School of Public
Health and a visiting professor at
cision to take life is, by orders of magColumbia University School of Law.
nitude, more important than other
criminal verdicts. Compare, for exVALERIE WEST is a doctoral
ample, the intensity with which citicandidate at New York University.
zens and policy makers debate the
proper parameters of the death penalty, to the relative invisibility of
"cruel and unusual" in violation of analogous discussions of the proper
the Constitution. 2 Because "' [f] rom scope of murder as opposed to manthe point of view of the defendant, slaughter, or of mandatory minimum
[death] is different in both its sever- terms versus life without parole.
ity and its finality,' "and "' [f] rom the Similarly, the agonizing of relatives of
point of view of society, the action of murder victims over whether to press
the sovereign in taking the life of one for the death penalty-and their ve-

punishment in the United
he
legal"rests
treatment
of on
capital
States
squarely
the
predicate that the penalty of death is
qualitatively different from a sentence of imprisonment, however
long. Death, in its finality, differs
more from life imprisonment than a
100-year prison term differs from
one of only a year or two." 1 This
predicate is among "the evolving
standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society" and
determine whether a punishment is
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of death as a punishment
drastically increases the
imthnrtne nf

a reliable conviction
and sentence.

hemence when their answer is
"yes"--are rarely matched when the
question is whether to charge first- as
opposed to second-degree murder,
or to seek life without parole as opposed to a term of years.'
The possibility of death as a punishment also drastically alters the
criminal process. Because "the
Eighth Amendment requires increased reliability of the process by
which capital punishment may be imposed," the Supreme Court has repeatedly defined the sentencing
stage of a capital proceeding as a
separate "trial" at which important
due process protections apply that do
not apply to other sentencing proceedings or even to guilt determinations at non-capital trials.' As was recently explained by states' attorneys
who prefer to devote resources to
1. Woodson v. North Carolina,428 U.S. 280, 305
(1976).
2. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958). See
Greggv. Georgia,428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
3. Lankford v. Idaho, 500 U.S. 110, 125 (1991).
4. See, e.g., Fryer, Family Weighs Death-Penalty Issue: Like Many Others, Slaying Victim's Relatives
Have Doubts About Executions, Seattle Times, May
14, 2000, at B3; Rice, Families Oppose Executions
(Letter to the Editor), Chicago Trib., Feb. 26,
2000, at 24; Montgomery, 'I Would Like Him to Suffer, but He Won't, Wash. Post, May 27, 2000, at B1;
Romano, Mixed Feelings In a Murder Case, Wash.
Post, May 6, 2000, at A3; AP, A Victim's Dad Applauds Death Sentence, Houston Chron., Sept. 22,
2000, at 38.

prosecuting general crimes rather
than to "'extremely expensive"' capital cases:
By the very nature of the gravity of the
case, defense lawyers and prosecutors
spend more time on a capital case than a
noncapital one. It takes longer to pick a
jury, longer for the state to present its
case and longer for the defense to put on
its witnesses. There are also considerably
greater expenses for expert witnesses, including psychologists and, these days,
DNA experts. Then come the
defendant's appeals, which can be considerable, but are not the biggest cost of
the case, prosecutors say. 6
And, as Felix Frankfurter noted,
"[w]hen life is [put] at hazard in a
trial, it sensationalizes the whole
thing .... "7
The belief that the decision to take
life matters more than other criminal
verdicts also has prodded centuries
of Anglo-American law to define
murder ever more narrowly and precisely.' The goal of these efforts has
not been to keep from misdirecting
the onus of a conviction of that crime,
but instead to keep from overusing
5. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 405 (1993).
See, e.g., Ramdass v. Angelone, 120 S. Ct. 2113, 2117
(2000); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28 (1986);
Caldwell v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320 (1985); Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203 (1984); Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Estelle v. Smith,
451 U.S. 454 (1981); Bullington v. Missouri, 451
U.S. 430 (1981).
6. Bonner and Fessenden, States with No Death
Penalty Share Lower Homicide Rates, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 23, 2000, at Al, A23.
7. Frankfurter, OF LAw AND MEN 81 (1956).
8. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S.

183, 198-99 (1971).
9. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280
(1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
10. See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71
(1932); Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156, 196
(1953); Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 637-38

(1980).

11. Liebman, Fagan, and West, "ABroken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases, 1973-1999,"
<papers.ssrn.cm/ paper.taf?abstract-id
232712>, at i, reprinted in part in Liebman,
Fagan, West and Lloyd, Capital Attrition: Error
Rates in Capital Cases 1973-1995, 73 TEx. L. REV.
1862 (2000).

death as the sentence for it. When England divided its single, capital offense of taking the life of another
(homicide) into two offenses (manslaughter and murder), it was not because in the natural scheme of things
there are two distinct types of killing
that the law must distinguish, but because death was recognized as too severe a penalty for many killings. Thus
arose the distinction between killing
with "malice," for which the mandatory punishment was death, and killing without malice, for which death
could not be imposed.
After the Revolution, American
legislators concluded that even the
narrowed category of malice murder
was too broad to justify death across
the board, and they divided it into
"degrees," with only murders of the
"first degree" (e.g., premeditated
ones) permitting the still-mandatory
penalty of death. When, despite this
innovation, jurors routinely refused
to convict even clearly premeditated
killers of first-degree murder because
they believed death was too severe a
penalty, American states gave jurors
discretion to spare the lives of defendants convicted of first-degree murder. When the exercise of that discretion
proved
arbitrary
and
discriminatory, the Supreme Court
in the 1970s ordered states to distinguish more accurately and objectively among murders that do and do
not warrant the death penalty, while
still taking individualized factors into
account. This led states to bar the
death penalty except (generally
speaking) upon proof of (1) murder,
(2) in the first-degree, that is (3)
capitally aggravated, and (4) more
aggravated overall than mitigated. 9
For centuries, therefore, the recognition that death is a qualitatively
more serious penalty than any other
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has driven Anglo-American law to define capital murder ever more precisely-and to insist that defendants
are convicted of it ever more accurately10 -for the single, crucial purpose of assuring that all capital sentences that result are legally and
factually deserved. Capital crimes
and convictions matter so much because of how much the resulting capital sentences matter.
Based on the premise that the accuracy and legality of verdicts of death
matter most in assessing the capital
system's success, we spent nine years
collecting data on the validity of the
5,760 capital verdicts imposed by
American states between 1973 and
1995 as judged by the capital system's
own judicial inspectors. In A Broken
System: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995, we report that 68 percent
of all verdicts fully reviewed in that
period were found to be so seriously
flawed that they had to be scrapped
and retried. Where outcomes are
known (for state post-conviction reversals), only 18 percent of retrials
resulted in the reimposition of death.
Seventy-five percent ended in a sentence less than death for murder, and
seven percent ended in an acquittal.
"Our 23 years worth of results," we
concluded,
reveal a death penalty system collapsing
under the weight of its own mistakes.
They reveal a system in which lives and
public order are at stake, yet for decades
has made more mistakes than we would
tolerate in far less important activities.
They reveal a system that is wasteful and
broken and needs to be addressed. "
In Capital Appeals Revisited, Professors Barry Latzer and James N.G.
Cauthen claim that these levels of error are tolerable, and they criticize A
Broken System for raising an alarm.
Their principal claim is that our cat-
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egory of "serious error" should be divided into two types of errorso-called "sentencing" and "conviction" error-and that only conviction
error matters. For them, errors that
seriously compromise "only" the decision whether to impose "imprisonment or death" are not a matter of
"major" policy concern. Latzer and
Cauthen make two further claims:
(1) When their two types of error are
analyzed separately based on a
sample of 837 state court reversals of
capital verdicts, the unimportant
type-"sentencing" error-is more
prevalent than the important type"conviction" error-so that the
"true" error rate is lower than we report. (2) Because the sentence of
death is qualitatively different from
all other sentences, courts look
harder for error in capital than in
non-capital murder cases, explaining
why courts (as Latzer and Cauthen
ultimately acknowledge) find substantially more serious error in capital than in non-capital murder verdicts.
We make four points in reply: (1)
The error rates we calculate are a
valid measure of the risk that our existing capital system mistakenly executes the wrong people, i.e., ones
who have not committed acts of sufficient culpability to make death a legal punishment. (2) Latzer and
Cauthen's measure of "conviction"
error does not validly assess that
risk-or anything else-because it
systematically undercounts "conviction" error and arbitrarily assigns
identical reversals to opposite categories. (3) Their central claim-that
policy makers and citizens ought not
be concerned with mistaken decisions to take life, or with erroneous
executions that result-is out of line
with American criminal and constitutional law and the considered judgments of the people who adopted,
operate, and rely upon the capital
system. (4) Although the "death is
different" premise of Latzer and
Cauthen's last section is correct, the
inference that capital verdicts are
more carefully scrutinized for error
is unjustified; the opposite may be
true.

A measure of risk

nocent of the death penalty?"14 Sup-

Before explaining why high rates of
reversible error in death verdicts can
help measure the risk that our capital
system condemns and executes the
wrong people-ones who did not
commit acts for which death is a legal
penalty-we explain why other proposed measures are unworkable.
Innocence measures. Some claim the
best way to measure the risk that capital verdicts are wrong is to count the
number of innocent people who
have been executed. 12 To succeed,
however, the innocence inquests that
any such study would entail would require that experts conducting them
have access to evidence in government files that bears on the guilt or
innocence of executed peopleDNA samples included. No state conducts such inquests or requires officials to cooperate with them. As a
result, officials regularly refuse to disclose such information and often destroy it. 13
In addition, this is not a measure of
risk but of already sustained harm.
Using it frustrates the goal of risk assessment-heading off harm before
it occurs-by requiring, in effect,
that the reactor explode before steps
can be taken to avoid the calamity.
Given how hard it is to detect capital
calamities that have occurred, and
how unwilling officials are to aid in
doing so, it is difficult to distinguish
reliance on this measure of risk or
harm from a means of covering it up.
There is a more fundamental problem. Homicide is a capital offense
only if it is (1) murder (2) in the
first-degree, that is (3) capitally aggravated (e.g., by the statutory aggravating factor that the defendant
knowingly took the life of a peace officer), and overall is (4) more aggravated than mitigated. Suppose Jones
is executed for his part, with Williams, in killing an undercover police
officer, Smith, in the course of a drug
deal. Jones was not innocent. He
and Williams killed Smith, and their
role in the drug deal made the killing
culpable homicide. But did Jones
commit a crime for which death is a
legal punishment? Or, in the Supreme Court's phrase, wasJones "in-

pose the killing was accidental, so
only second-degree murder or man-
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slaughter, but the witness who could
prove it was never disclosed by the

police or tracked down by Jones's
lawyer. Or suppose the killing was
first-degree murder but was not capitally aggravated because Williams (as
he confessed in a statement never disclosed to the jury) did not tell Jones

that Smith was a policeman. Or suppose the offense was more mitigated
than aggravated because Jones was
mentally retarded, had a clean

record and participated under duress by Williams, the triggerman, who
received a life sentence-things
Jones's lawyer never told the jury. In
all these situations, a wrongful execution occurred. But it is missed by an
innocence-based measure of risk.
In declaring a moratorium on executions in his state, Illinois Governor George Ryan recently cited a different measure of risk: a comparison
of the number of "death row exonerations" during the modern death penalty era (88 nationally; 13 in Illinois)
to the number of executions in the
same period (650 nationally; 12 in Illinois). Better-than 1-to-7.5 national
odds that a death sentence will end in
exoneration not execution (or better
than 1-to-i odds of the same thing in
Illinois) certainly imply a substantial
risk of erroneous capital verdicts and
executions. But like the prior one,
this measure is impaired by inadequate information and is too narrow. It takes about 10 years on average for capital verdicts to get through
the overburdened review process.
Most death sentences revealed by a
snapshot of the system (such as the
one taken by an exonerations-to12. See, e.g.,
Cassell, We're Not Executing the Innocent, Wall St. J., June 16, 2000 at A14; Wilson,
Where's the Proof Innocent Are Being Executed?,
Houston Chron.,July 14, 2000 at A17.
13. See, e.g.,
Dwyer, Soft On Napping Lawyers,
DNA, N.Y. Daily News, Mar. 5, 2000 at 8 (describing officials' systematic destruction of rape kit
evidence in Houston following exoneration of
Kevin Byrd); Enzinna, Afraid of a Shadow of a
Doubt, Wash. Post, May 7, 2000 at B8 (discussing
post-execution refusal to produce and destruction of DNA evidence by Virginia officials); Masters, DNA Testing in Old Cases Is Disputed, Wash.
Post., Sept. 10, 2000, at Al.
14. Sawyerv. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 334-35, 33839, 343-49 (1992).

executions analysis) have not, therefore, led to exonerations, executions,
or any other conclusion. Instead,
they are awaiting review. If, on average, the review process leading to exonerations takes longer than the
review process that precedes executions,15 the number of each that have
occurred as of a given moment will
underestimate the exonerations-toexecution odds once review finally
occurs. The reverse is true if the time
to execution is usually longer than
the time to exoneration.
The exonerations-to-executions
measure may underestimate risk in
other ways. If an innocent person is
executed, the measure is doubly
skewed because it counts as an execution what should have been an exoneration. Exonerations also exclude a
number of probably innocent prisoners whose capital verdicts are reversed and who are set free following
pleas to lesser offenses and "time
served." For an innocent prisoner
who has spent years on death row due
to a mistaken trial verdict, an offer of
immediate release on time served instead of risking another faulty trial
15. See, e.g., Dieter, "Innocence and the Death
Penalty: The Increasing Danger of Executing the
Innocent," <http://www.essential.org/dpic/
inn.html> (discussing exonerations of Clarence
Brandley, Henry Drake, Vernon McManus, and
Rolando Cruz after 10 years; Patrick Croy and
Gary Nelson (11 years), Randall Adams (12
years) Joseph Brown andJohn Knapp (13 years);
Ricardo Guerra (15 years); Anthony Porter (16
years), James Richardson (21 years); Paris
Carriger (22 years)).
16. See, e.g., Brown, From Death Row to Halfway
House, Phoenix Gazette, Jan. 24, 1995, at B1
(John Serna, released on time served after eight
years); Dieter, supran. 15, at 19-20 (SoniaJacobs
and Mitchell Blazak, same, after 16 and 20
years); Moore, Cloud of Doubt, Houston Chron.,
Sept. 12, 1999, at 18 (Kerry Cook, same, after 18
years); Death Penalty Information Center
(DPIC), Additional Cases of Innocence and Possible Innocence, July, 1997, <http://www.
essential.org/dpic/dpicrecinnoc.html> (Lee
Perry, Anthony Scire, and Andrew Mitchell,
same, after 7, 9, and 18 years; Victor Jimenez,
released on time served plus 18 months after
nine years).
17. Latzer and Cauthen claim incorrectly that
"many in the national press" misread A Broken System as a study of reversals of capital "convictions."
Of 12 national press stories on our report that we
have identified, 11 accurately describe it as a
study of capital "verdicts," 'Judgments," "convictions and sentences," or "sentences." Even the
one publication they cite gives an accurate account of the reversals we studied in all but the
single paragraph they quote (and also described
it accurately in an accompanying editorial) and,
at our insistence, printed a correction of the one
mistake. See Metro. Desk, Corrections,N.Y. Times,
June 14, 2000.

proved to the requisite degree of cerverdict may be one he can't refuseeven if the outcome is one an exon- tainty that the defendant committed
erations researcher can't compute. 16 capitally punishable acts, or that (2)
Finally, exonerations require out- the procedures used to make that
right acquittal of homicide or the showing not only were illegal (and
defendant's release upon a state for the most part, unconstitutional)
attorney's decision not to prosecute. but also (a) were inherently unreliThey miss prisoners like our hypo- able and prejudicial, (b) were so dethetical Jones who receive lesser con- monstrably prejudicial that but for
victions or sentences after their death the faulty procedure there is a probverdicts are reversed due to serious ability that the outcome would have
error, and who were wrongly con- been different, (c) had a "substantial
demned for homicides that were and injurious" effect on the verdict,
more mitigated than aggravated or or (d) were not "harmless."
We next examined the errors
not capitally aggravated at all, or
were not first-, or any, degree of mur- based on which courts at the state
der. An exonerations-to-executions post-conviction stage actually remetric misses many such reversals. versed death sentences, finding that
For every one capital state 80 percent fall into four categories of
post-conviction reversal between serious error-egregiously incompe1973 and 1995 that led to a not-guilty tent defense lawyers, prosecutorial
finding, there were seven that led to suppression of evidence and other
misconduct, misinstruction of juries,
other outcomes less than death.
Our measure. A Broken System uses a and biased judges and juries. The
different measure of the risk of erro- first three types of error (accounting
neous capital verdicts and execu- for 76 percent of the reversals) retions: the rate at which "death sen- quire proof of a probability that the
tences subjected to judicial error changed the outcome of the
inspection nationally and in... [each trial; the last type (decision-maker
of the] death-sentencing states [a] re bias) is inherently prejudicial.
found to be seriously flawed and
We then considered the possibility
[a]re reversed by the courts," or put that the judges who found all these
another way, the amount of "error reliability-threatening errors were, as
that substantially undermines the re- a class, prone to find error or hostile
liability of the guilt finding or death to the states' death penalty laws. We
sentence imposed at trial."' 7 This discounted this hypothesis upon findmeasure avoids the informational dif- ing that high error rates were remarkficulties faced by the measures dis- ably consistent over time and across a
cussed above because it permits a dis- broad range of judicial decision makpositive answer for each of the ers in many states, the vast majority of
thousands of capital verdicts that whom were unlikely to be sympathetic
have been finally reviewed: during to convicted killers or hostile to state
our 23-year study period, 68 percent law: (1) Judges in office throughout
were overturned because of a sub- the period 1977 to 1995 found overall
stantively or procedurally flawed de- error rates of more than 50 percent in
termination that the defendant com- each of those years save one. (2)
mitted culpable enough acts to Judges with jurisdiction in all but two
of the 28 states in which death senpermit a death sentence.
To assess the usefulness of this fig- tences were imposed and finally reure as a measure of the risk of deadly viewed in 1973 through 1995 found
mistakes, we first examined the types 50-percent-plus rates of error. (3)
of legal error based on which courts State trial and appellate judges, the
may reverse capital verdicts, conclud- vast majority of them elected, ordered
ing that such errors almost always 90 percent of the approximately 2500
undermine the reliability of death capital-verdict reversals we identified.
verdicts. Reversals are not the prod- (4) Most of the remaining, federal reuct of "technicalities" but of judicial versals occurred when most federal
findings that (1) the state never judges were Reagan and Bush appoinSeptember-October 2000
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tees. (5) The rates of error found by
federal judges on habeas review are almost identical to (and slightly lower
than) those found by state high courts
on direct review.
Finally, we followed-up the state
post-conviction reversals in our study
to see if outcomes changed when errors were cured on retrial-something that would occur only if the errors triggering the reversals were
serious. We found that 82 percent of
the outcomes changed from a verdict
that the defendant must die to a decision that he should live: 75 percent
received sentences of imprisonment
for some degree of homicide; 7 percent were acquitted. The errors
prompting these reversals were not
trivial or technical. They evidently
led thousands ofjurors to misjudge a
defendant's culpability by at least the
margin of his or her life.
For these reasons, the decades of
high reversal rates we documented
nationally and in most capital states
provide strong evidence that American death verdicts-decisions that
men and women have committed sufficiently culpable acts that they legally may, and should, be executedare generally unreliable. There is, in
sum, a high risk that many capital verdicts are wrong.

Intolerable risk
This risk is intolerable for two reasons. First, even if appeals could
catch all the serious, reliabilityimpairing errors that occur, doing so
requires a hugely expensive inspection process, which most death verdicts fail (68 percent between 1973
and 1995), followed by similarly
costly repair efforts on retrial which
also usually fail, resulting in a lesser
sentence or acquittal (82 percent of
the time following state postconviction reversals). As Latzer and
Cauthen say about convictionfocused retrials, every retrial at which
life is at stake "is costly to the criminal
justice system, burdensome to the
witnesses, and painful to the family of
the murder victim." Moreover, because at any given time the vast majority of death verdicts are bottled up
in a decade-long review process, and
76 Judicature Volume 84, Number 2

most that exit the process are sent
back, the rate of death sentences carried out from 1973 to 1995 was 5 percent. As would be true of any other
government or private-sector operation, a 68 percent failure rate upon
inspection, an 82 percent scrap rate
upon repair, and only a 5 percent
rate of products working as planned
is not cause for congratulations
about a well-oiled quality-control machine but a good reason to overhaul a
bankrupt production process.
Worse, there is reason to fear that a
high risk of unreliable capital verdicts
means a high risk of wrongful executions-appeals notwithstanding. Unless the criteria for identifying flaws
and the judges applying them are perfect, the 68 percent rate at which
judges find serious error that impairs
the reliability of capital verdicts implies some odds that they miss other
unreliable verdicts. The fact that state
judges found serious error in 47 percent of the capital verdicts they reviewed, and yet federal judges found
serious error in 40 percent of the verdicts that cleared the state inspections,
shows that judges and review criteria
are not perfect. So does evidence that
some states have faulty error-detection
systems. 18 And so especially do the
cases of Ronald Monroe (Louisiana),
Anthony Porter (Illinois), Don
Paradis (Idaho), Lloyd Schlup (Missouri), and Earl Washington (Virginia), all of whom were proven innocent or probably so after their death
verdicts passed a full set of judicial inspections.
The likelihood of
"misses" has increased, moreover, as
the number of death verdicts under
judicial review has risen from 635 in
1979, to 3,752 in 1999.

A flawed measure
Latzer and Cauthen dispute our measure of risk and propose their own:
the number of capital "convictions,"
as opposed to "sentences, " that
courts found seriously flawed. They
collect a sample of 837 published reversals of capital judgments by state
supreme courts, divide them into
so-called "conviction" and "sentence"
reversals, jettison the latter as unimportant, and come up with a "reversal
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rate in death penalty cases [that] is
closer to 27 percent."
Four methodological defects deprive Latzer and Cauthen's study of
validity. First, they are forced to use
phrases like "closer to 27 percent"
when juxtaposing their number of
"conviction" reversals to our 68 percent figure for all capital reversals because the comparison they purport
to make is classically one of apples
and elephants. They derived their
number by merely sampling reversals
between 1990 and 1999. We counted
all reversals between 1973 and 1995.
Because the numbers are based on
different sets of cases, they are not
comparable.
Second, Latzer and Cauthen's sampling method undercounts so-called
"conviction" reversals. To begin with,
Latzer and Cauthen generated their
sample using search terms ("death
penalty," "capitalmurder," "sentenced to

death," or "death sentence"; the word
"conviction" was not used) that are
nicely designed to capture most cases
where a "death sentence" is reversed
but are not well designed to capture
cases where a "conviction" is overturned and in which there, accordingly, need be no mention of the "sentence" or its "capital" character. The
sample also excluded reversals by state
intermediate courts, even when they
were the highest court to rule on, and
reverse, death verdicts. We have no
idea how many reversals Latzer and
Cauthen's sample misses because
many of their cases are from years we
did not study. But we have good reason to think that most of the missed
cases were "conviction reversals,"
which, as a result, were undercounted.
A quick search of only a subset of
the years Latzer and Cauthen
sampled revealed 40 captial reversals their sampling method misses.
Eighty-three percent are "conviction"
reversals. 20

Third, Latzer and Cauthen indiscriminately mix their biased but relatively large sample of direct appeal
18. See Liebman, Fagan, West, and Lloyd, supra
n. 11, at 1858 n.57 (discussing evidence of faulty
error detection in Virginia).
19. See Dieter, supra n. 15; DPIC, supra n. 16.
20. A list of the 40 cases is on file with JUDICATURE.

reversals with a less complete sample
of state post-conviction reversals
(many of which occur in unpublished and lower court opinions that
the authors did not count). Without
knowing the relative proportions of
reversals that occurred at each review
stage in their study and in the unithe
verse
of all reversals,
convictions-versus-sentencing breakdown for reversals they discovered at
each review stage, and the effect on
each breakdown of the authors' various sampling decisions, the stew of
cases in their sample provides no basis for judging the actual rates of
"conviction" and "sentencing" reversals at either review stage or at the
two combined.
Most crucially, Latzer and Cauthen
assign cases to their two categories"conviction" and "sentence" reversals-based on an arbitrary distinction between identicalreversals. The
result is a meaningless count of reversals in each category. Although
Latzer and Cauthen never explain
their terms, they evidently define a
"conviction" reversal as one requiring a new first, or "guilt," phase of
trial, and a "sentence "reversal as one
requiring a new second, or "sentencing," trial. What they fail to note, or
even to realize, is that different states
assign different functions to the two
trial phases.
As noted, most capital-sentencing
states predicate death sentences on
four findings: that the crime, beyond
a reasonable doubt, was (1) murder
(e.g., because the killing was intentional), (2) in the first-degree (e.g.,
because it was premeditated), (3)
capitally aggravated (e.g., because the
21. See Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231
(1988); Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862 (1983).
22. In Latzer and Cauthen's view, it is only error in finding 4 that is unimportant. Their explanation-that finding 4 reversals mean only that
the reviewing judges "disagreed" with the sentencing jurors on the subjective question
whether a death sentence was deserved-fundamentally misconceives capital appeals. Judges
can reverse capital verdicts due to error in finding 4 only if they conclude that the procedures or
instructions that led to that finding are erroneous in one of the same objective ways that lead to
reversals of findings 1-3. When courts reverse
based on finding 4, moreover, they do not generally substitute a sentence of their choice, but (as
with finding 1-3 reversals) remand for a new trial
at which death can be imposed again.

victim was a peace officer); and was
(4) more aggravated overall than mitigated. State law varies, however as to
whetherfindings (2) and (3) are made at
thefirst or the second phase of trial. Some

states make both findings at the first
phase; others make both at the second
phase; and still others make the
first-degree finding at the first phase
and the capital-aggravation finding at
the second phase. 25
Latzer and Cauthen acknowledge
that all serious errors in deciding
whether an offense was first-degree
murder (finding 2) and capitally aggravated (finding 3) are cause for
concern. 22 But they arbitrarily assign
only some of those errors to their "im-

portant" category of "conviction" error. Only when the state in question
happens to use the first trial phase to
make the finding that was flawed do
Latzer and Cauthen deem it "conviction" error. When the relevant state
makes the very samefindingatthe sec-

ond phase-as is true for finding 2 in
major capital states like Florida,
Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas, and
for finding 3 in nearly all statesLatzer and Cauthen relegate the identical error to the supposedly irrelevant category of "sentencing"
reversals. If an erroneous "firstdegree" or "capital-aggravation" finding is a serious defect when it occurs
in California and Louisiana, there is
no reason to treat the same error as
irrelevant when it occurs in Florida
or Texas. But Latzer and Cauthen do
just that-in the process, seriously
undercounting so-called "conviction" error.
To justify dividing capital reversals
into two categories based on their
relative significance, Latzer and
Cauthen must explain how the two
types of reversals differ in an important and well-specified way, and must
accurately count the number of each.
Their theoretical and methodological hodge podge of "conviction" and
"sentencing" reversals does neither.
Nor is any other division likely to
be convincing, because it must inevitably assume-with Latzer and
Cauthen-that some errors decisive
of life or death ought not concern
citizens and policy makers, no matter
September-October2000

how often they occur. Herein lies our
main disagreement with Latzer and
Cauthen. For them, a verdict that
wrongly decides "only" whether the
facts and law permit a man's life to be
taken gets essentially everything
right. For us, a verdict that is wrong
by the margin of a person's life is essentially wrong.

Deadly error
The fundamental purpose of any system of "capital punishment" is to decide accurately whether the defendant has committed acts of sufficient
culpability that the law permits death
as a penalty. Accurate assessments of
the defendant's guilt of murder,
first-degreemurder, capitalaggravation,
and net aggravationare all crucial to
that decision. If the system cannot
make all those assessments accurately
at least some substantial proportion
of the time, it fails to achieve its fundamental purpose. Any useful measure of risk applied to the system
must assess the likelihood that its verdicts are accurate in all four ways.
Nor is it surprising that the fundamental object of the system cannot
be described except as the accurate
imposition of the "sentence" or "punishment" of death. Because the penalty of death is qualitatively different
from a sentence of imprisonment,
however long, and because it is of vital importance to the defendant and
community that any decision to impose the death sentence be based on
reason rather than caprice or mistake, the fear of inaccurate
life-or-death decisions has haunted
American law, the evolving standards
of decency, defendants, victims,
policy makers, courts, citizens, and
the press.
This emphasis on accurate death
verdicts is of course driven by moral
and legal judgments that Latzer and
Cauthen may dispute. But neither
their views, nor ours, on the point affect A Broken System's conclusion that
the capital system is collapsing under
the weight of its own mistakes. The
audience for the report is the people
who adopt, operate, depend upon
continued on page 99
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